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Webster: Judges Are (and Ought to Be) Different

JUDGES ARE (AND OUGHT TO BE) DIFFERENT
Peter D. Webster*
Scott Hawkins’s Perspective on Judicial Merit Retention in Florida1
makes a number of important points, one of which in particular warrants
emphasis as Florida voters prepare to go to the polls to determine the
fate of the justices and appellate judges standing for retention. The role
a judge plays in our society is (and ought to be) fundamentally different
from that played by a politician or other elected representative. Judges
do not (and should not) have a constituency. They do not represent
anyone;2 rather, their sole allegiance must be to the rule of law.
Judges do not enjoy the luxury of being able to choose from among
the issues brought before them those they will decide. They are
frequently called on to address contentious issues as to which our
society is sharply divided. Regardless of the outcome, one or more
segments of society are likely to be displeased.3 This is especially true
with regard to one of the judiciary’s most important responsibilities—its
counter-majoritarian role as guardian of the rights of individuals,
minorities, and groups lacking financial or political power.4 Frequently,
the performance of this duty is irreconcilable with popular sentiment;5
but this is precisely what was intended by our Founding Fathers.6
By virtue of the oath they take, judges are obliged to decide cases
based exclusively on the facts and the controlling law. This is not
* Shareholder, Carlton Fields, P.A.; Judge, Florida First District Court of Appeal (1991–
2011); Fourth Judicial Circuit (1986–1991). B.S.F.S., Georgetown University, 1971; J.D., Duke
University School of Law, 1974; LL.M, University of Virginia School of Law, 1995.
1. 64 FLA. L. REV. 1421 (2012).
2. See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 525 (1951) (―Courts are not representative
bodies. They are not designed to be a good reflex of a democratic society. . . . Their essential
quality is detachment, founded on independence.‖) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
3. See IRVING R. KAUFMAN, CHILLING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE 10 (1979) (noting that
―[n]o institution . . . can hope to resolve issues of such significance without frequently incurring
the wrath of many members of society‖).
4. See Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 241 (1940) (―Under our constitutional system,
courts stand against any winds that blow as havens of refuge for those who might otherwise
suffer because they are helpless, weak, outnumbered, or because they are non-conforming
victims of prejudice and public excitement.‖); see also 1 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME
COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 303 (1926) (quoting Judge William Cranch) (―In dangerous
times, it becomes the duty of the Judiciary calmly to poise the scale of justice, unmoved by
armed power, undisturbed by the clamor of the multitude.‖). The view that such a countermajoritarian role might be critical in the adjudication of certain types of constitutional issues is
expressed in the famous footnote 4 of the Carolene Products opinion. United States v. Carolene
Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152–53 n.4 (1938).
5. See Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 400 (1991) (―[P]ublic opinion should be
irrelevant to the judge’s role because the judge is often called upon to disregard, or even to defy,
popular sentiment.‖).
6. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 527 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
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always easy, particularly when the case is high-profile, the issues are
emotionally charged, and the law does not provide a clear answer. 7 Yet,
this principle forms the very foundation of the concept of a rule of law,
rather than of individuals.
We are, of course, all products of our life experiences. Those
experiences are, to a large extent, what distinguish us from one another.
To the extent that wisdom ever comes, it comes only from experience.
We all acquire biases and prejudices over the course of our lives. We
would not be human if we did not.8 When one becomes a judge,
however, he or she is expected (to the extent humanly possible) to put
aside or, perhaps more accurately, to recognize those biases and
prejudices and not allow them to influence the outcome of cases.
There are those in America today who insist that the process of
judging involves unbridled discretion—that judicial decisions are in
reality nothing more than political choices disguised by legal jargon.9
Such people insist that, like other public officials, judges must be held
directly accountable for their decisions, usually by the electorate.10 In
fact, this is the premise upon which Restore Justice 2012 appears to
base its opposition to the three Florida justices standing for retention in
November.11 According to that organization:
Throughout our country and our state, judicial activism
represents a serious threat to our liberty. Judges play
partisan politics and cater to special interests, ignoring the
constitution and threatening our protection under the law.
Fortunately, here in Florida, we have a recourse. Every
judge is periodically reviewed and placed on the ballot for a
7. Judge Benjamin Cardozo referred to such cases as those ―where a decision will
advance or retard . . . the development of the law.‖ BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE
JUDICIAL PROCESS 165 (1921). According to him, ―many of [such cases] might be decided either
way‖ because ―reasons plausible and fairly persuasive might be found for one conclusion as for
another.‖ Id.
8. See id. at 12–13.
9. This is the position of those in legal academia who consider themselves members of
the Critical Legal Studies movement. See, e.g., David Kairys, Legal Reasoning, in THE POLITICS
OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 11, 16–17 (David Kairys ed., 1982).
10. Shortly after the 1996 defeat of Tennessee Supreme Court Justice Penny White in a
retention election marked by a vitriolic campaign in which her opponents blatantly distorted her
record, Tennessee Governor Don Sundquist said: ―Should a judge look over his shoulder [when
making decisions] about whether [he’s] going to be thrown out of office? I hope so.‖ Stephen B.
Bright, Political Attacks on the Judiciary, 80 JUDICATURE 165, 166 (1997) (first alteration in
original) (quoting Paula Wade, White’s Defeat Poses a Legal Dilemma: How Is a Replacement
Justice Picked?, MEMPHIS COM. APPEAL, Aug. 3, 1996, at A1) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
11. See RESTORE JUSTICE 2012, http://www.restorejustice2012.com (last visited Oct. 24,
2012).
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merit retention vote.12
Such an impression regarding our judiciary is irreconcilable with the
principle that forms the very foundation of the concept of a rule of law.
It is also refuted by reality.
In the United States, and in the State of Florida, we have wagered
much on the proposition that judges will, to the extent humanly
possible, decide cases based exclusively on the facts and the applicable
law. Every day, in courthouses all around America, jurors are told that
they must not let bias, sympathy, prejudice, public opinion, or any other
sentiment for or against any party influence their decision; rather, they
must base their verdict exclusively on the evidence presented and the
law given to them by the judge. We expect jurors to follow that
instruction, and we trust that they will. The same is true of judges.
Every day, in courthouses all around America, judges decide cases
based exclusively on the relevant facts and the applicable law. We
expect judges to abide by the oath they took, and (as with jurors) we
must trust that they will. It is this, perhaps more than anything else, that
distinguishes the judicial branch from the other two.13
So, when Florida voters go to the polls in November to decide the
fate of the three supreme court justices and fifteen district court of
appeal judges standing for retention, they would be well-advised to bear
in mind the difficulty of the work those judges perform—especially in
those cases where the law offers no clearly correct answer, as is often
true of cases before the highest court in a jurisdiction.14 They would
also be well-advised to remember, as our Founding Fathers
understood,15 that faithful performance by these judges of their work
will frequently result in outcomes at odds with popular opinion or the
views of those in one or both of the other branches of government.16
That is, after all, precisely why our Founding Fathers chose to insulate
the federal judiciary from extraneous influences, whether emanating
from another branch of government, popular opinion, or special
interests. It is also what makes our system (which is the envy of the
12. Connect, RESTORE JUSTICE 2012, http://www.restorejustice2012.com/action/connect/
(last visited Oct. 24, 2012).
13. As Karl Llewellyn observed, judges are trained in a particular way—they are ―lawconditioned officials.‖ See KARL N. LLEWLLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 19 (1960). They
have ―a felt duty to Justice [and] a felt duty to The Law . . . .‖ Id. at 59. There are, moreover, a
number of unifying and stabilizing influences at work in the judicial branch. Our court system is
hierarchical—decisions of lower courts are reviewable by higher ones. Appellate courts are
multi-judge tribunals—cases are decided by panels of judges, rather than by an individual.
Appellate decisions are generally handed down in writing—judges must justify their decisions.
14. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
15. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 6, at 527–29.
16. See supra notes 3–6 and accompanying text.
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world) one of justice rather than of the rich and powerful.
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